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Expressive Enlightenment: Subjectivity and Solidarity in
Daniel Garrison Brinton, Franz Boas, and Carlos Montezuma
Forthcoming in Ned Blackhawk and Isaiah Wilner (eds.), Indigenous Visions: Rediscovering the
World of Franz Boas (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017)

In September 1899, a German journal of geography called Globus published an obituary
for the American ethnologist Daniel Garrison Brinton. It was one of a handful of signed
obituaries that its author, Franz Boas, would write in his long career. Boas concluded his words
on Brinton with the following evaluation:

The importance of his example for the development of American anthropology cannot be
overstated. For many years, his voice was the only one that called us back from the
excessive specialization that had begun to pose a threat to the general scientific point of
view in itself. If anthropology is to find a firm footing in America, it is thanks in no small
part to the labors of the deceased.1
Boas’s memorial to Brinton is a statement of devotion, an homage to a colleague who inspired
and defended a collective scholarly enterprise—an “us” with which Boas clearly identified. Yet
his devotion has gone entirely unremarked in histories of American anthropology, and this is not
just a matter of archival oversight. Although Brinton has long been dismissed by historians as a
racist, he also began a momentous new movement in American anthropology, a movement that
Boas himself would bring to fruition. Yet to understand the affiliation that linked Boas to
Brinton, it will be necessary to think in new ways about anthropology at the turn of the twentieth
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century and the social, moral, and discursive world within which this nascent discipline found
itself.
For a long time now, scholars have agreed that Boas’s relationship to Brinton was one of
deliberate and successful supersession. Boas, the story goes, displaced Brinton and his methods
on the way to becoming the preeminent anthropologist of his time.2 Little evidence exists to
suggest that Boas and Brinton understood their relationship in this way, but this has rarely
bothered historians of anthropology. They relate the narrative of Boas’s supersession of Brinton
as part of a larger and more profoundly moralized story about how the American anthropological
establishment learned to stop using race as an explanation for human difference and human
behavior and to rely instead on the “modern, relativistic, pluralistic anthropological approach to
culture.”3 These two narratives have become so thoroughly conflated, with Brinton playing the
racialist foil to the rise of the Boasian culture concept, that it has become all but impossible to
understand why Boas would want to single out Brinton as the “lone voice” who put American
anthropology on a “firm footing.”
The difficulty facing us can be traced back to Boas himself. Recent research by Lee
Baker has shown that by the turn of the twentieth century Boas had come to see the fight against
racism as the decisive struggle of his age. That struggle required that he deal with Brinton—a
powerful, indeed founding, figure in the profession who was also a vocal segregationist and anti-
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miscegenationist—extremely gingerly.4 In the context of the struggle against racism, a public
affiliation with Brinton would have introduced an unneeded twist into the moral narrative of
racial inclusiveness that Boas was striving to construct. Yet Boas’s calculated effort to dodge any
affiliation with Brinton in the North American press might also be seen, in light of his far-flung
obituary, as an effort to protect his predecessor’s reputation by keeping him out of a fight that
Boas knew he was doomed to lose. Boas recognized that history had drawn him into a global
fight against racism and he embraced the challenge; but his homage to Brinton can be read as an
acknowledgement that their conflict over race had made it impossible to actualize other scholarly
possibilities, affiliations, and struggles. Boas’s memorial demands that these possibilities be
brought to light. It compels us to ask: What intellectual projects had to be displaced or silenced
in order for the culturalist critique of race to become the basis of American anthropology?
In this paper I want to recover one of these set-aside projects, the one that Boas saw
Brinton as having fostered, thereby providing the “firm footing” he stood on throughout his
career. This project, which Brinton referred to as “the philosophy of expression,” he first
conceived as an intervention in the field of comparative philology inspired by Wilhelm von
Humboldt’s axiom on the fundamental nature of language. “In itself,” Humboldt had proclaimed,
language “is no product (Ergon), but an activity (Energeia).”5 Language, Brinton learned from
Humboldt, was not a ready-made object that could be looked upon from the detached perspective
favored by natural scientists, for it was only by virtue of linguistic practice—people using
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words—that different forms of human experience (including the experience of scientific
knowledge) were constituted.
On the basis of this understanding, which came to be known as the “expressiveconstitutive” dimension of language, Brinton departed from his American contemporaries. He
elaborated in the 1880s a methodological critique of the ascendant “naturalistic school” of
linguistic anthropology, a critique that he would soon apply to all those scientists who had fallen
under the sway of “the positive philosophers, who insisted that events and institutions must be
explained solely from the … objective world.”6 It was due to Brinton’s attempt to conduct the
human sciences from a first-personal perspective—an intervention that began with his
Humboldtian reconceptualization of language as “expression”—that Boas credited him with
putting their common discipline on a “firm footing,” notwithstanding the fact—which Boas also
saw—that Brinton never ceased to defend a theory of “psychic unity” that contradicted, even
fettered, his most promising insights.
Boas took over Brinton’s philosophy of expression and reformed it by abandoning its
naturalistic ontology of the human psyche. One outcome of this work of rectification was a thesis
that might be read as a leitmotif of Boas’s entire career. “To the ethnologist,” Boas wrote, “the
most trifling features of social life are important because they are expressions of historical
happenings,” and not, as Brinton had thought, because those facts are “expressions of the general
consciousness of Humanity.”7 What is the difference between “history” and “the consciousness
of Humanity,” and why did it matter to Franz Boas? And why, at the same time, was it important
to him to retain the concept of expression? If we can come to some understanding of the stakes
6
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of this highly abstract disagreement—which is also a moment of concurrence and continuation—
we can begin to make sense of Boas’s Globus memorial and, more importantly, reconstruct how
Boas built upon Brinton’s “firm footing” a viable discipline, universal in scope and possessed of
a moral vision of knowledge as a collective practice of symbolic self-becoming.
The mode of expressive enlightenment in which Boas and Brinton both took part, far
from being limited to the pages of journals, was an ethical attitude distributed far and wide
across turn-of-the-century American culture. Anthropologists participated in it, but they were not
its inventors. What we risk failing to see, if we consider Boas’s understanding of human
language solely from the perspective of Euro-American intellectual history, is that circulating
media like the Yavapai physician Carlos Montezuma’s activist newspaper Wassaja and the
NAACP’s Crisis, edited by W. E. B. Du Bois, also drew upon and fulfilled a “philosophy of
expression” that bore a family resemblance to, but was not wholly descended from, the kind of
disciplinary knowledge put into practice by Boas himself.8 Instead of positioning Brinton and
Boas as adversaries, stand-ins for race and culture, we can understand both better when we
recognize their mutual imbrication in this wider discursive field—a rhetoric of expression that
charged the cultural politics of race with philosophical urgency, inspiring a social project to
understand the symbolic activities of humans and make use of them to bring into being new
transcultural futures.

I. “Speak!”
Although the term “expression” has a long Euro-American history, it took on a new
significance following the emergence in Europe of a self-consciously modern form of
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subjectivity that the philosopher Charles Taylor has referred to as the “disembedded” or
“buffered” self. This new kind of self found itself possessed of new “powers of moral ordering”
that enabled and encouraged an attitude of holding oneself apart from the natural world and the
extra-human influences that, in a previous era, had penetrated the “porous” self as part of that
world.9
The newness of this situation manifested itself in a new kind of philosophical inquiry into
the history of the human faculties, an inquiry whose classic question—How did human language
originate and develop from pre-history to the present?—inspired a richly variegated genre of
speculative history. This genre of philosophy was about more than language considered
objectively. By inquiring into the origins of language, the philosophes of the eighteenth century
were engaged in a process of self-interpretation, a coming-to-terms with the mysterious sources
of their own peculiar form of experience. How one answered the question of language’s origin
carried high stakes because variant answers entailed different attitudes about how one ought to
live one’s life in the present day.
This was the ethically charged context in which an expressive theory of language
emerged in the modern West, most decisively in the writings of Johann Gottfried Herder.
Herder’s impact on American anthropology has been discussed in many ways, but what I want to
trace here, following Taylor, is the way Herder took it upon himself to theorize and model a
whole style of modern self-comportment.10 Like other philosophers of his time, Herder
celebrated the buffered self’s new powers of self-definition. Yet he worried that the people of his
9
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age were morally lost, set adrift from one another in a vast and increasingly confusing world
from which older forms of belonging and certainty had vanished. Herder exhorted would-be
philosophers of his day to consider the demands placed upon reason by their historical
predicament. “You can no longer have effect like Socrates—for you lack the small, narrow,
active, compressed stage!” he exhorted in a 1774 essay, This Too a Philosophy of History for the
Formation of Humanity. “A citizen of the earth, and no longer a citizen at Athens, you naturally
also lack the perception of what you should do in Athens, the certain feeling of what you do, the
sensation of joy at what you have accomplished.”11 Herder’s preeminent concern, given the
eclipse of this older moral universe, was to discern how modern experience might give rise, in a
fundamentally new way, to “a perception of what you should do … the certain feeling of what
you do.”
The trouble with modernity, as Herder saw it, was that its ways of organizing social space
could no longer provide an obvious path to older “feelings” of moral certainty. The flip side of
the buffered self’s new powers of moral ordering was that such feelings could no longer be seen
as immanent in pre-defined roles and relationships, as they had been in ancient Athens. “The
feeling of what you do,” if you are Socrates (or, more precisely, Herder’s imaginary Socrates), is
bound up with the fact that it’s a common practice to talk about metaphysics over a six-hour
dinner, or to cajole one’s neighbors on their way home from the marketplace. Herder saw that he
inhabited a much larger and more impersonal world, increasingly mediated not by face-to-face
interaction but by infrastructures of communication—newspapers , scholarly institutions, the
state. These media abstracted speech from its scenes of utterance and reproduced discourse as an
objective social fact, what would later be called “information.”
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This state of affairs could not simply be rejected. Herder’s powerful new idea was to
associate the “feeling of what you do” in modernity with the very practice that modern life
seemed to have rendered obsolete or at least invisible—the act of speech itself, undertaken
against all odds and even with no interlocutors present at hand. As he urged his modern Socrates,

The scope of your sphere perhaps compensates for the less determinate quality and
lacking quality of your beginning! A hundred people will read you and not understand
you, a hundred read and yawn, a hundred read and despise, a hundred read and slander, a
hundred read and prefer to have the dragon-chains of habit and remain who they are. But
keep in mind that perhaps a hundred still remain left over with whom you bear fruit –
when you are long since decayed, still a world of posterity which reads you and applies
you better. World and world of posterity is your Athens! Speak!12
What’s remarkable about this passage is the way it enacts what it’s trying to describe. Herder
communicates to his readers with a kind of speech capable of demonstrating how speech itself
can be experienced as answering to a moral imperative. He thinks speech can be made
intelligible to his readers in this way because they are buffered selves living in a social world that
has closed down certain “feelings of what to do” but opened other ones up—above all, the
feeling that, by being brave enough to “Speak!” to a world of strangers, one might give rise to a
kind of enunciation that circulates with an unprecedented range, beyond this “world” and into a
“world of posterity.” Herder’s text is a foundational elaboration of the constitutive picture of
language that would soon become associated with the term “expression.”
Herder’s early formulation of the expressive-constitutive dimension of language would
have profound ramifications in Germany and beyond. Kurt Müller-Vollmer and others have
shown, for instance, that Wilhelm von Humboldt’s picture of language as an Energeia rather
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than an Ergon was indebted to Herder’s notion of speech as a medium of world-making.13
Herder’s understanding of what Sean Kelly has called “perceptual normativity”—his sense that
the “feeling of what you do” is given not by some impersonal moral law but by one’s embodied
experience of a specific situation—might also be seen as a source of Humboldt’s insistence that
the historian has a moral obligation to “enliven and refine our sense of acting on reality” and to
shun “metaphysical” forms of inquiry that require an “abstracting from all experience.”14 Herder,
and Humboldt too, thus developed one way of coming to terms with the historicity of the
buffered self and its powers. But it was not the only way.
Today, the best-known account of the origins of humans’ linguistic powers is Étienne
Bonnot de Condillac’s Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge (1746). Like Herder, Condillac
had both a theoretical story about language’s relation to modern experience and a moral vision of
how that story pertained to the scientist’s “task.” Whereas Herder argued that forms of subjective
experience vary throughout history, Condillac insisted that human experience is the
transhistorical process through which we take in sensory data and organize them into thoughts.
We do this by means of the “operations of the mind,” chiefly language, since “ideas connect with
signs.”15 Condillac’s idea of language can be understood as a naturalistic philosophy of
experience, since the fact that “ideas connect with signs” is in the first instance a fact about
nature, not about human beings.16 According to Condillac, our cognitive faculties never
fundamentally change, even though we learn over time based on trial and error. History, in this
13
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view, is the story of our coming to a better understanding of the limits we’ve been placed under
by nature. And since we already have a good sense of how nature works from mechanical
sciences like physics, we can get more certain about who we are by trusting the same methods.
While claiming to avoid the “confusion which now prevails in metaphysics and moral
philosophy,” Condillac conferred an implicit moral duty upon the buffered self. He insisted upon
humans’ obligation to live within nature-determined limitations on what it is permissible to think
about oneself and one’s place in the world—a view that would later be called the “ethics of
belief.”17 What distinguishes this ethical project of the buffered self from Herder’s is that it
understands our “feeling of what to do” as the result of objective laws, not as a historically
emergent activity arising from the contexts of particular forms of life. It is a scheme of moral
improvement designed for the buffered self, and only the buffered self, to excel at.
While Herder’s philosophy of language, through the mediation of Humboldt, found its
way into the learned institutions of Prussia, Condillac’s found fertile ground in the young United
States, where it would captivate the imagination of American linguists until well after the Civil
War.18 In the generation leading up to Brinton’s entrance onto the scene, its most up-to-date
articulation was William Dwight Whitney’s theory of languages as “institutions.” For Whitney,
to say a language was an institution meant that it was collectively invented or “instituted,” and
not discovered. This was a significant departure from Condillac’s conception of language as a
naturally endowed faculty, but it reproduced his view that language had a purely instrumental
role in human betterment. Whitney saw languages, like “steam-engines,” “tubular-bridges,” and
17
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“Brussels carpets,” as an “instrument of thought, the machinery with which the mind works; an
instrument by which its capacity to achieve valuable results is indefinitely increased, but which,
far from being identical with it, is one of its own products; with and by which it works with
freedom.”19
Central to this understanding of language is the supposition that the human mind can
abstract itself from the flow of experience, bringing the “freedom” of a third-personal
perspective to bear upon itself. It is only from this detached standpoint that human freedom can
be imagined to exist in a purely “negative” relation to its products—indeed, so much so, that it
would seem to diminish human freedom to argue, as Herder had done, that language is in some
way constitutive of our “feeling of what to do.” Whitney dubbed linguistics a “historical”
discipline because its object of study was a human invention; yet by construing language as an
invention— a product, an Ergon—he did what Humboldt said the historian should never do. He
considered historical phenomena in abstraction from experience. “The facts of language,”
Whitney famously remarked, “are almost as little the work of man as is the form of his skull.”20
One can understand why the founder of semiology, Ferdinand de Saussure, whose linguistics
course was premised on the regimentation of the diachronic and experiential by the synchronic
and systematic, spoke of Whitney as “l’Américan Whitney que je révère.”21
Shortly after his return from graduate school in Europe, Brinton dedicated himself to
articulating a Humboldtian “philosophy of expression” capable of standing up to the “naturalistic
school” that predominated in the human sciences of his time. He did everything he could to play
Herder to Whitney’s Condillac. Whereas Whitney insisted that language was an internally
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coherent formal system that obeyed natural laws, Brinton saw each language as a “thought world
in tones” shaping our experience such that it couldn’t be analyzed in a purely objective fashion.22
Whereas Whitney cautioned his readers against “metaphysical” theories of language coming out
of Germany—theories that could only constrain human freedom by misidentifying it as one of its
“institutional” creations—Brinton insisted that language, “which will perish only when
intelligence itself, in its highest sense, is extinguished,” was indistinguishable from human
cognition and thus from freedom itself.23
Brinton made his neo-Humboldtian project relevant to late-nineteenth-century Americans
by emphasizing dimensions of language that could only be characterized from the first-personal
point of view of a historical subject. These dimensions had been utterly effaced by naturalistic
linguistic methods, which approached language as an Ergon—not as a creation of God,
necessarily, but as something that existed in nature as a complete and coherent system. To say
language is complete and coherent is to assume that there exist clear boundaries that separate it
from other entities in the order of Nature. It was owing to Brinton’s sense of the inadequacy of
this parceling-out of the precincts of Nature that Boas would later remember him as having
“called us back from the excessive specialization that had begun to pose a threat to the general
scientific point of view in itself.”
And yet, despite Brinton’s avowed allegiance to the Humboldtian way of looking at
language, in key respects he departed from the Humboldtian historian’s task of refining “our
sense of acting on reality.” Boas put his finger on this problem in his obituary, where he wrote
that “Brinton’s strengths and weaknesses were conditioned by his intellectual disposition, which
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saw in all particularities above all the verification of the universal law.... Hence the richness of
his stimulating thought and the lack of penetrating analysis of individual phenomena.”24
Boas’s identification of Brinton’s shortcoming as an inattentiveness to “particularities” is
more than just a question of scale, of Brinton being interested in big things and Boas being
interested in small things. What’s at stake here is Brinton’s oscillation between the two styles of
being a buffered self that I identified earlier with Condillac and Herder. Thus the unresolved
conceptual tension—reflected in Brinton’s famous slogan, “Man is everywhere different, and
everywhere the same”—between the constitutive power of human language on the one hand and,
on the other, what Brinton called the “psychic unity of man.”25 The question that repeatedly
arises in Brinton’s work is whether this “psychic unity” does not itself possess the character of an
Ergon, something coherent and complete that we step into when we are born—in which case the
“sense of what you do” that manifests itself to particular people in particular situations would
have little relevance to a general characterization of human experience. A similar question can
ultimately be raised about the way Brinton understood the term “expression,” as for instance in
the slogan I cited earlier, that “the facts of ethnology must ever be regarded as the expressions of
the general consciousness of Humanity.”26 Are the members of humanity giving rise to these
“facts” to be understood as constituting historically variable forms of life, or does “expression”
merely refer to the mechanical process through which behavioral tokens are reproduced from a
fixed “psychic” type?
Boas’s worries about Brinton’s ideas about language were borne out in the way Brinton
imagined the anthropologist to engage with the world he studied. Unlike Herder and Humboldt,
24
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Brinton’s study of subjectivity entailed a radical decontextualization of the self. He held that
everything important about our experience is reducible to the contents of our consciousness.
“Men,” Brinton wrote, “do not live in material things, but in mental states; and solely as they
affect these are the material things valuable or valueless.”27 Neither our unconscious bodies nor
the world beyond the buffered self can provide us with any moral guidance about the kinds of
beings people essentially are. For Brinton, the most successful strategy for coping with the
“milieu” beyond the mind was to withdraw from it entirely. “The progress of man,” he declared,
“is his progress of gaining independence from nature, of making her forces his slaves and not
leaving them his masters.”28 The metaphor of “mastery” here is not unrelated to Brinton’s
investment in scientific racism. The downfall of the non-white races, Brinton proposed, was that
they remained too embedded in environments that, over time, corrupted their bodies and minds.
“The peculiar traits of races can with entire propriety be considered pathological; for the more
completely they adapt a group to one environment, the more do they unfit it for any other.”29
Brinton’s inclination to blame the environments that non-whites inhabited for their racial
“pathologies” thus worked hand-in-hand with his investment in a certain picture of what it is to
be a buffered self, a sum of “mental states” utterly cut off from one’s environment, the more cut
off the better.
The longer one spends with Brinton, the more difficult it becomes to determine whether
the ethics of belief Brinton deployed to police his theory of “psychic unity” is best interpreted as
an inconsistency in a fundamentally Humboldtian way of looking at the world, or whether
Brinton’s entire “philosophy of expression” was just a way of sugarcoating the deflationary
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pessimism that followed from his erection of an unbridgeable “psychic” barrier between the
world and the self’s experience of it. Ultimately, the best way to make sense of Brinton is to see
him as attempting to rise to the challenge of self-interpretation that Taylor associates with
modern selfhood, a project that is as much about coping as it is about coherence. Undoubtedly,
Brinton was attuned to something unsatisfying about the intellectual world of his day. He saw in
the Humboldtian tradition a theoretical solution to some of the problems posed by that world; but
as a matter of practice, the third-personal, policing attitude gave him a clearer sense of moral
purpose.
Boas, in “The Limitations of the Comparative Method of Anthropology,” recognized this
attitude in Brinton when he interpreted his predecessor’s notion of psychic unity as a
consequence of having adopted the position that “anthropological studies must be confined to
researches on the laws that govern the growth of society.”30 By maintaining that stance, Brinton
left open a possibility—a way out of his “confinement”—that he himself was not able to realize.
The question left open for Boas was, What else could anthropology be?

II. Expressions of Historical Happenings
The epochal insight that Boas brought to American anthropology—the insight that, as we
shall shortly see, made him a great if sometimes unwitting affiliate of the many projects of
collective self-determination taking shape at the outset of the twentieth century—was that
knowledge could be a means of affiliating oneself with the world and its people. In formulating
this insight, Boas drew on many intellectual sources, including experiences with indigenous
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collaborators.31 His first major statement of it was “The Study of Geography” (1887), written
shortly after Boas’s return from Baffinland, in which Boas concluded of the “effort to delineate
the earth’s surface” that “every step that brings us nearer the end gives ampler satisfaction to the
impulse which induces us to devote our time and work to this study, gratifying the love for the
country we inhabit, and the nature that surrounds us.”32 As Matti Bunzl has argued, Boas showed
himself in this essay to be engaged in a scholarly project closely aligned with that of that of
Humboldt and Herder.33
If Herder and Humboldt worked out a certain style of being a buffered self, one that seeks
“to enliven and refine our sense of acting on reality” (Humboldt) and to seek the “feeling of what
you do” (Herder) by turning outward and confronting one’s particular historical predicament, it
was Boas who advanced this modern mode of self-interpretation by showing how the “feeling of
what you do” derives from the affective solicitation presented by the objects one studies. Boas
advanced a new form of science that paid homage to the ideas of Alexander von Humboldt’s
Cosmos, and which Boas named cosmography—science that “has its source in the personal
feeling of man towards the world, towards the phenomena surrounding him.”34 Whereas the
“physicist” or “naturalist” seeks to gratify an “aesthetic impulse” driving him to systematize the
chaos of experience, the force of the “affective impulse” drives the research of the
cosmographer. Whereas Brinton thought that humans refine their psychic faculties by insulating
themselves from their environment, Boas reimagined anthropological knowledge as a process of
directing oneself outward, into the world.
31

See Isaiah Lorado Wilner, “A Global Potlatch: Identifying the Indigenous Influence on Western Thought,”
American Indian Culture and Research Journal 37, no. 2 (2013): 87–114.
32
Originally published in Science 9, No. 210 (1887): 137–141; reprinted in Race, Language and Culture, 647.
33
Bunzl, Matti. “Franz Boas and the Humboldtian Tradition,” in Volksgeist as Method and Ethic: Essays on
Boasian Ethnography and the German Anthropological Tradition, ed. George W. Stocking (Madison: University of
Wisconsin Press, 1996), 17–78..
34
Boas, Race, Language and Culture, 644.

We are now in a position to understand the difference between Boas’s interest in
historical happenings and Brinton’s interest in the “consciousness of Humanity.” For “The Study
of Geography” might profitably be read as a theorization of the historian’s responsibility, as
imagined by Wilhelm von Humboldt and his followers, to “enliven and refine our sense of acting
on reality.” Boas viewed cosmography (and later anthropology) as a “historical science”—not
merely, as Brinton had assumed, an effort to discover causal laws that history may bear out but
never change.35 At this early phase of his career, Boas was concerned dramatically to expand the
scope of who and what an intellectual might care about. “To the ethnologist,” Boas wrote, “the
most trifling features of social life are important because they are expressions of historical
happenings.”36 What makes these happenings expressive is not their emanation from humanity’s
“universal consciousness,” but their existence as part of an affective exchange between the world
“we inhabit” and the inquiring self.
Boas’s continuation of Herder’s project raises two questions. First, how could a vision of
anthropology’s task that is so focused on the particularities of experience aspire to the
universality and progressiveness of modern science? Second, in what way is Boas’s affective
account of anthropological knowledge not—as the “philosophy of expression” might ultimately
have been for Brinton—a just-so story told to render the alienation of the modern subject more
bearable? Answering these questions in the right way can forestall a common misinterpretation
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of Boas’s project, which holds that he was engaged in a project of “Counter-Enlightenment.”37
This view sees Boas as part of a long intellectual movement traceable to Herder’s teacher Johann
Georg Hamann, who abandoned the imperious claims of modern reason in favor of a relativistic
celebration of the primal attachments of the “Volk.” Such an abandonment would amount to a
reenchantment, or “unbuffering,” of the modern buffered self: it would solve the predicaments of
modern truth-telling by demystifying modernity itself.
But this isn’t at all what Boas wanted, for himself or anyone else. Boas shared in the
characteristically modern aspiration to advance science, an endeavor which he believed “helps
free us from the errors of the past.”38 Boas’s understanding of scientific progress was somewhat
unusual, since he did not think the correction of scientific error developed from the replacement
of bad “explanations” with better ones. Instead he followed Goethe in holding that “a single
action or event is interesting, not because it is explainable, but because it is true.”39 If one
approaches a phenomenon with an idea that it is a piece of data to be explained, one has already
ceased to act as a world-oriented scholar and become something else: a “naturalist” governed by
an internal “aesthetic impulse.”40 Unlike Brinton, Boas wanted to get back in touch with the
phenomena of the world. He sought not only explanations but a heightened feeling of
connectedness.
As in the case of Brinton, Boas’s idea of the scholar’s proper relation to the world
connected to his understanding of language. In his “Introduction” to the Handbook of American
Indian Language, Boas grounded his career-long inquiry into human symbolic activity in a
37
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theory of what he called “secondary” understandings41. Secondary understandings are reflexive
linguistic phenomena: they comprise our explicit self-understanding of our experience in all its
dimensions. And yet, despite our modern aspiration to cognitively master our experience, Boas
argued that secondary understandings are subject to contingencies of unconscious experience
that are largely beyond our control. “Even our scientific views, which are apparently based
entirely on conscious reasoning,” Boas explained, are formed “under the influence of strong
emotions.” To square the “Introduction” with “The Study of Geography,” our views are
responsive to the “affective impulse” governing our experience, according to which the self finds
itself ineluctably drawn into the world without knowing why ahead of time.42 In order for one’s
secondary understandings to become better attuned to one’s environment, one has to get into the
right relation not just with the world, but with oneself. One has to recognize oneself as the kind
of being whose picture of the world is changeable.
Boas’s theory of secondary understandings showed the attitudes of scientific experts to be
subject to the very same “impulses” as the people whom they typically studied. This motivated
his departure from Brinton on the question of how to respond to modernity and of who could
take part in that response. In “The Aims of Ethnology,” Boas wrote that “the same kind of
struggle that the genius has to undergo among ourselves in his battle against dominant ideas or
dominant prejudice occurs among primitives and it is of particular interest to see in how far the
strong individual is able to free himself from the fetters of convention.”43 Moments like these,
which recur throughout Boas’s writings, reveal their author’s enthusiasm for a certain project of
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enlightenment, a freeing of humanity from superstition. But in order to understand the modes of
relation to the people Boas persisted in calling “primitive”—that is, colonized people—that his
version of that project made possible, it is important to grasp the term “enlightenment” in its full
dimensionality.
One understanding of the Enlightenment, Enlightenment with a capital E, holds that it
was a period of intellectual and cultural history. Those who see Boas as part of the “CounterEnlightenment” tend to assume that he looked backwards upon the Enlightenment as a discrete
period of history that was already complete, or that had proven itself incapable of completing
itself, such that a new kind of inquiry, the Counter-Enlightenment, had to be initiated. It’s true
that Boas, in his 1904 essay on the “History of Anthropology,” traced the origins of modern
anthropology back to the classic Counter-Enlightenment figures—to Rousseau’s voicing of “the
deep-seated feeling that political and social development was the result of a faulty development
of civilization,” and to “Herder’s Ideen zur Geschichte der Menschheit, in which, perhaps for the
first time, the fundamental thought of the development of the culture of mankind as a whole is
clearly expressed.”44 There is a real sense in which everything Boas accomplished, his whole
updating of the Humboldtian philosophy of expression, can be seen as the unfolding of a
possibility emergent in this late-eighteenth-century moment. This raises the question of whether
Boas did not take up a project that was anachronistic—or, worse, intellectually imperialistic—
from its very origin: what right did Boas have to recreate “primitive man” in the image of a
Galileo or Spinoza, engaged in a “battle against dominant ideas or dominant prejudice”?
If we take Boas seriously, such a question, which casts colonized peoples as an object (or
Ergon) of scientific inquiry, examination, and explanation, misconstrues anthropology’s
significance as a modernizing practice of enlightenment. For Boas, as for Herder, modernity
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named a moral crisis that required a new receptivity to the constraints and possibilities emergent
within a given form of life. Over time, Boas came to study colonized peoples not to understand
modernity’s pre-history, but to explore the variety of ways in which human beings attune
themselves to the crises of the present. As he wrote in his preface to Race, Language and
Culture:

Growing up in our own civilization we know how we ourselves are conditioned by it,
how our bodies, our language, our modes of thinking and acting are determined by limits
imposed on us by our environment. Knowledge of the life processes and behavior of man
under conditions of life fundamentally different from our own can help us to obtain a
freer view of our own lives and of our life problems.45
In turning back to Herder and Rousseau, Boas’s purpose was not to locate himself within a grand
narrative of intellectual history, but to specify a problem that emerged in his own experience.
Boas saw in these eighteenth-century figures the germ of an account of “our life problems” as
“historical” in the particular sense with which he used that term, the sense of being solicited by a
world toward which the self has to get in the right relation.
Enlightenment, then, can also be understood in the lower-case, not as a closed moment
but as a continuing process, a coming-to-terms with history through the cultivation of a certain
style of being a buffered self. We find a cognate understanding expressed in Michel Foucault’s
later formulation of enlightenment as an “ethical attitude” as a mode of relating to the present
times and to oneself as a modern subject. “To be modern,” Foucault writes, “is not to accept
oneself as one is in the flux of the passing moments; it is to take oneself as object of a complex
and difficult elaboration. …This modernity does not ‘liberate man in his own being’; it compels
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him to face the task of producing himself.”46 It is this style of being a buffered self, this
reckoning with today that culminates in the discursive constitution of a self with “a freer view,”
that I want to understand as expressive enlightenment.
This form of expressive enlightenment—self-enlightenment through affective exchange
with the world surrounding the buffered self—could only be achieved through an interaction
with a world that was always already social, a world comprised of other selves possessed of
other secondary explanations, all—Boas hoped—striving to get themselves attuned to the world
in a way that gratified their “affective impulse” toward it. For Boas, expressive enlightenment
was a mode of discursive affiliation that would connect the members of the human community
with time. Toward the end of his life, he wrote, “It is my conviction that the fundamental ethical
point of view to be taken is that of the in-group which must be expanded over the whole of
humanity. This leads naturally to the conclusion that the individual must be valued according to
his own worth and not the worth of a class to which we assign him.”47 To recognize individuals
according to their “own worth” is to presuppose in those individuals themselves a capacity for
self-production. Boas did not hesitate to say that this was the way he looked at the world and the
way he sought to empower others. “My whole outlook upon social life is determined by the
question: how can we recognize the shackles that tradition has laid upon us?” he wrote. “I
consider it the duty of those who are devoted to the study of social problems to become clear in
regard to these questions and to see to it that through their influence the intellectual chains in
which tradition holds us are gradually broken.”48
Boas looked for allies in this project of enlightenment wherever he could find them, in
other societies (where he found “primitives” engaged in the “same kind of struggle that genius
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has to undergo among ourselves”) as well as in his own. To Boas, an enlightened attitude toward
oneself seemed the only condition of modern belonging worth endorsing at a time when
“secondary understandings” were creating new barriers between people. Boas, like Herder, saw
that the modern creation of “the whole of humanity” followed from the unavailability of older
forms of attachment. “On the whole in the history of mankind as the size of groups has
increased, their solidarity has been weakened,” he wrote, “and with that the rights of the outsider
have been recognized.”49 What makes up for the weakening solidarity of these expanding groups
is a mode of belonging facilitated through discourse circulating among those “outsiders,” those
who never subscribed to the in-group’s traditions or who expressively defined themselves in
opposition to them.
A solidarity constituted through the circulation of discourse requires peculiar protocols of
mutual recognition through which members of expanding in-groups can manifest themselves to
one another across time and space. One such protocol of mutual manifestation, for those
committed to expressive enlightenment, was the term expression itself. As Foucault observes,
Kant understood the Enlightenment slogan—Sapere Aude!—as a Wahlspruch or “a heraldic
device, that is, a distinctive feature by which one can be recognized, and…also a motto, an
instruction that one gives oneself and proposes to others.”50 Near the end of the nineteenth
century, expression became the Wahlspruch of a new mode of enlightenment. Brinton and Boas
both had a role to play in bringing this to pass; whatever their theoretical differences, they used
the term to convey a shared intention to deal with the world, and one’s ethical relation to oneself
as a knower of that world, in a new and more receptive way. From Brinton’s slogan that the
“facts of ethnology are expressions of the general conscious of humanity” through Boas’s maxim
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that “the most trifling events are significant because they are expressions of historical
happenings,” we can witness the gradual refinement of a specific style of being a buffered self,
one designed to cope with and contest a rival style of knowledge-making that looked upon the
world as Ergon.

III. Beckoning
Expressive enlightenment was not merely a form of scholarly knowledge, a Boasian
strategy to build upon Brinton’s “firm footing” a viable scientific discipline. It was a relational
form of becoming that gratified the “affective impulse” directing the inquirer outward, into
affiliation with the world and its people. This activity of imagining new cross-cultural affiliations
made a difference in twentieth-century America, but to appreciate its significance we need to
look past the precinct of anthropology. Beyond the human sciences, the mode of expressive
enlightenment was also discovered—simultaneously, as it were—by poets, philosophers,
politicians, and social activists, who developed it in a diversity of inflections. Across American
society, the Wahlspruch of expression, and the modern attitude of self-production that it
signaled, facilitated the affiliation of disparate individuals who resolved to become themselves
by speaking out in public.
We can begin to appreciate the breadth of this collective manifestation by briefly
considering the field of philology, a field that, like ethnology, underwent a momentous
transformation in the last decades of the nineteenth century. One can trace this transformation—
closely connected to the emergence of the modern discipline of literary studies—precisely by
following the etymology of “expression” in the published works of critics and rhetoricians
around the turn of the twentieth century. Prior to the rise of the English department in America,

“expression” was a synonym for enunciation. It was part of a scholarly discipline through which
teachers taught students to speak according to established rules of conduct. As late as 1887, J. H.
Gilmore, Professor of Rhetoric at the University of Rochester, could hope to find an audience for
his Outlines of the Art of Expression, a “little book,” as described in its Introduction, that “has
grown, in the author’s class-room, out of an attempt to supplement the defective early training of
his pupils ...[with] a knowledge of those particular elements of Grammar which are distinctively
characteristic of the English tongue.” Gilmore’s vision for the progress of his students’
knowledge had nothing to do with the process of self-becoming I’ve been calling “expressive
enlightenment.” Speech was always to be governed according to elocutionary protocols authored
by experts who had foretold all possible scenarios of decorous utterance.51
By the 1880s, the days of Gilmore’s brand of prescriptive rhetoric were numbered.
According to an influential cadre of ambitious young professors who taught English, not Latin,
and who counted themselves as proponents of “modern” philology, the study of a literary text
was to be imagined precisely as a mode of enlightenment. When Columbia professor Joel
Spingarn, a leader of this new movement, insisted that great works of literature ought to be seen
as exemplifying an “art of expression,” he explained at length that this phrase meant not that
works of literature conformed better than other texts to certain prescribed “Rules,” but that the
meaning of literature depended on its exemplary effect on the life of a reader. Like Brinton and
Boas, Spingarn traced this understanding of expression across the Atlantic and backward in time
to thinkers like Goethe, Herder, and Hegel. It was with them in mind that he wrote, in his 1910
lecture “The New Criticism,” that the basic objects and aims of literary inquiry were
fundamentally expressive:
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What has the poet tried to do, and how has he fulfilled his intention? What is he striving
to express and how has he expressed it? What impression does his work make on me, and
how can I best express this impression?52
In modern philology as in Boasian anthropology, as witnessed later by Ludwig Lewisohn’s
Expression in America (1930) and F. O. Matthiessen’s American Renaissance: Art and
Expression in the Age of Emerson and Whitman (1943), the Wahlspruch of expression came to
serve as a watch-word for those who saw literature as Energeia rather than Ergon.53
Now, one could argue that this realignment of literature as a project of expressive
enlightenment was not, in relation to anthropology, a “simultaneous discovery” so much as a
parallel development derived from a common tradition—a separate branch of the same Romantic
family tree. But this is not the path I want to pursue here, for two reasons: first, expressive
enlightenment flourished even among peoples avowedly hostile to Euro-American intellectual
traditions; and second, even among the scholarly elites we’ve been examining, expressive
enlightenment was experienced not primarily as a set of theoretical propositions but rather as a
way of re-imagining the social world in which they lived. The really important question raised by
the ascendency of expression in ethnology and philology is not how an idea travelled, in ways
we might not have recognized, between one intellectual and another, but rather how, at this
particular moment in time, expression became a discursive basis for a new kind of collectivity.
This gives us a way of coming back to the historiographical question about collective identity
with which we started, the question of why the cultural politics of race can be thought about as
unfolding within, traveling alongside, or even surrounding the history of expression.
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One figure who can help us measure the scope of expressive enlightenment and its
relation to the politics of cultural belonging is Carlos Montezuma, the Yavapai doctor,
pamphleteer, and founding member of the Society of American Indians. Montezuma was a selfdeclared “abolitionist.” Throughout his career, he advocated the immediate dissolution of the
United States Office of Indian Affairs, which he saw as the latest in a line of Euro-American
institutions designed to keep Indian people in a state of political and moral dependency. The
result of these institutions’ influence, Montezuma said, was the stifling of a people’s selfexpression:

The aborigines of America have never been in a position to express themselves. The
game of “the survival of the fittest,” competition of life in God’s appointed way, “by the
sweat of the brow,” have been too one-sided. It has been an awful unfair play to speculate
and weaken, to satisfy your aesthetic propensities.
To judge a race relative to their standard we must put ourselves in their place;
better still, be one of them.54
One could be forgiven for mistaking this for a rumination of Franz Boas, yet no evidence
exists to suggest that Montezuma ever read a word Boas wrote. Montezuma’s opposition
between “expression” and enlightened self-interpretation on the one hand (“to judge a race
relative to their standard we must put ourselves in their place”) and, on the other, an “aesthetic”
picture of an orderly universe subject to natural laws (“‘the survival of the fittest’…in God’s
appointed way”) shows that he had found his own way to distinguish between “affective” and
“aesthetic” speech, Energeia and Ergon. Throughout his career, Montezuma consciously
modeled for his audience this expressive attitude—an attitude that he thought could help his
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people come to terms with the predicament from which, as he put it in another speech, “we
Indians are struggling in the dark to find a way out.”55
We can begin to understand how Montezuma imagined Indian expression as a response
to his people’s historical predicament by looking at his self-published newspaper, Wassaja:
Freedom’s Signal for the Indian. Wassaja arose as a counter-publication to the official organ of
the Society of American Indians, the Quarterly Journal of the Society of American Indians (later
the American Indian Magazine), which Wassaja frequently upbraided for its conciliatory attitude
toward the Indian Bureau. Despite this political disagreement, though, the papers shared a
commitment to fostering a new pan-Indian public by adopting a deliberately ecumenical attitude
toward Indian speech. In the first issue of the Society’s Quarterly Journal, its editors announced
their intention to print “any expression on any Indian subject.”56

What sets Wassaja apart for

our purposes is the way it envisions the thematic open-endedness of Indian speech as an ethical
attitude adopted at the level of the self. It wasn’t enough for Montezuma to publish “any
expression on any Indian subject”; those expressions had to be loudly announced as historical
events because Montezuma thought it was always politically significant when an individual
Indian came into his or her public voice. “AN INDIAN EXPRESSING HIMSELF,” reads the
headline over one letter to the editor, a letter that Montezuma framed in order to convey his
understanding that expression was not merely a way of transmitting information about Indian
affairs, but was itself the best kind of news. Wassaja modeled the attitude of expressive
enlightenment that Montezuma wanted his readers to adopt. Not unlike Herder enjoining the
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modern Socrates of his imagination to speak, Montezuma set out to enact and solicit the same
kind of speech that he purported to describe.
Montezuma signaled to his readers his intention to use print discourse differently from
journals like the Quarterly by undertaking formal experimentation in his prose and, as Robert
Dale Parker has argued, in his poetry. Consider, for instance, the long poem “I Have Stood up for
You” (figure 2).57 Thematically, the message of the poem seems relatively straightforward: the
speaker wants his readers to know that they have a friend in Wassaja. “I have stood up for you,”
he says, through all “your” struggles against the Indian Bureau and against what “the palefaces
said.” But even as Wassaja gives his “you” the credit for surviving the antagonisms of
civilization while offering encouragement by asserting his loyalty, a strange sense emerges at the
end of the poem that Wassaja also wants to say the opposite. “You have proven yourselves to be
/ Whatever I have stood up for you to be,” he avers—as if Indians ought to see themselves as
having been constituted as a collective subject by virtue of what Wassaja has said on their
behalf. Here Wassaja presents itself as unconditionally committed to Indian people and
responsible for Indians being what they are.58 But how does this work? How can a paper stand
behind—that is, follow—what it also claims to lead? More fundamentally, who stands behind—
or leads—Wassaja?
Wassaja, it turns out, is the name Montezuma was given as a child by his Yavapai
grandmother. The word may be translated into English as “signaling” or “beckoning,” which
captures Montezuma’s sense of himself as a speaker to his people—and, as such, the creator of a
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new community. Montezuma gave his newspaper his name because he observed no distinction
between his subjectivity and its discursive manifestation. He was committed to an ethical attitude
of expressive enlightenment that required him to continually reconstitute himself in response to
the exigencies of the present.
The verse form of “I have stood up for you” communicated this. Wassaja wanted to be a
poet but, like Walt Whitman, he wrote most of his poetry in such a way that it sounded like prose
when read aloud. Even today we recognize “I Have Stood Up For You” as a poem not because of
its rhyme or meter but because when we look at the page we can see white space between the
line-breaks and capital letters at the beginning of each line. Wassaja’s identity was bound up
with the look and feel of print discourse, with speech spread over great distances into the hands
and minds not only of associates but also of strangers. This is one way in which Montezuma
modeled, in the content and form of his discourse, an ethical attitude committed to an ongoing
project of self-production.
In the pages of Wassaja, we can begin to see what it means to say that the mode of
solidarity engendered by expressive enlightenment is fundamentally discursive. It is made for a
world in which the voices of individuals circulate among strangers: “the wrong concept of us
Indians which the public entertains, is a phantom which can be cleared away only by education
and by our personal contact with the masses of the country,” Montezuma wrote in Wassaja in
1916. “It therefore behooves us to stand together and to teach the public differently.”59 The
implication is clear: if Indians don’t start speaking for themselves in view of a broader public,
then they can’t be free. Like Boas, Montezuma understood freedom to consist in the revision of
secondary understandings—the “phantom” caricature of Indian-ness that “must be cleared
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away”—through a kind of proleptic speech that constitutes the “people” to which it repeatedly
refers.60
Montezuma’s advocacy for expressive enlightenment in Wassaja has discomfited
commentators of all persuasions because it served as the engine of an emancipatory project, the
abolishment of the Indian Bureau and its colonial infrastructure. At the center of this project was
Montezuma’s animus for the Indian reservation. “The reservation,” Montezuma declared, “is a
demoralizing prison, a barrier to enlightenment, a promoter of idleness, gamblers, paupers, and
ruin.”61 Montezuma thought that Indians faced with the choice between the reservation and
“enlightenment” should opt for enlightenment and leave the reservation behind. As reservations
became sites of political and cultural mobilization, and ultimately homes and communities, many
scholars came to see Montezuma as an “assimilationist.” After all, he seemed to advocate the
abandonment of a distinctively Indian identity for a form of life imposed by a foreign power.62
This view has its merits but it effaces Montezuma’s keenest insights into the mutual imbrication,
in modern society, of power and discursivity. Montezuma attacked reservations because the
government made use of them to squelch opposition. “There is a good reason why you do not
hear from the Reservation Indians on freedom,” he wrote. “THEY ARE AFRAID to open their
mouths.” 63 Notwithstanding his anti-reservationism, this was a powerful new way of soliciting a
reconstituted and mass-mediated pan-Indian subject into being.
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Montezuma’s insistence on the need to speak was based on his notion of enlightenment
as an expressive process of self-transformation. The reservation system, he insisted, produced a
caricature of Indians by imposing a “script they did not write themselves.” As he put it in a 1905
article for the New York Daily Tribune:

The reservation system has been a monument to the want of knowledge of human nature
on the part of those who have been instrumental in perpetuating it. The failure to
recognize the brotherhood of man in the Indian, that he was a multiple being, however
ignorant he might be, and not more unified in his natural endowments and faculties than
other men subject to similar conditions and environments, has been his greatest
handicap.64
Indian identity, Montezuma insists here, must be seen as an instantiation of human nature as a
whole. It is in human nature to be a “multiple being,” not the cigar-store “phantom”
(Montezuma’s coinage) that stood in for Indians in the public eye. I understand Montezuma’s
idea of a “multiple being” to mean that Indians cannot, and must not, conform to the reductive
and unilinear understanding of human development advanced by the Bureau of Indian Affairs.
Far from seeking to abandon a distinctively Indian identity in favor of a scripted vision of
civilizationist progress, Montezuma saw expressive enlightenment as a way for Indians to fulfill
their multiple and protean selves, embedded in families, communities, tribes, and broader
regional networks that government-imposed identities obscured. Montezuma’s misrecognition
of the reservation as the source of his people’s troubles was a consequence—though not a
necessary one—of his prescient search for a broader, self-determining Indian identity. But how
could this more diffuse form of discursive solidarity be relevant or useful to American Indians
living under a specific kind of settler-colonial repression?
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Montezuma’s answer to the challenge of living Indian life globally paralleled Boas’s idea
of affective solicitation through the exchange of secondary understandings. Speaking in a genre
of persuasion that parallels Herder’s This Too a Philosophy of History, Montezuma enjoined his
Indian public to constitute itself in dialogue with those whose just-so stories about Indians
threatened to flatten them into caricature: the Indian Bureau, politicians, and anthropologists too.
In practice, the boundaries of Wassaja’s emergent public were necessarily porous. Montezuma
wanted it that way. After all, he wrote, it was only “by our personal contact with the masses of
the country” that Indian people could hope to correct the “phantom” image generated by the
Indian Bureau.
Montezuma’s motivating responsibility as an agent of expressive enlightenment came
from his Indian public, just as Boas’s came from anthropologists and Springarn’s from readers
and writers of English. Wassaja listened to what the wider world—for instance,
anthropologists—had to say, too. From time to time, when a sympathetic non-Indian wrote him a
letter, Montezuma would publish it in Wassaja. But it only counted as news when a new Indian
correspondent emerged or, better yet, when word came to him of a new Indian newspaper getting
off the ground. “More Indian papers by the Indians the better,” he wrote in 1919. “It shows the
Indians are coming out to express themselves.”65 By showing Indian and multiracial publics how
one could “Speak!” from a position of phantom-like un-freedom, Montezuma, like Boas, brought
himself into being.
In his effort to make expressive enlightenment the basis for a pan-Indian social
movement, Montezuma adopted an ethical attitude toward history and language that faces in the
same direction as that of Franz Boas. As far as we know, the two never came into contact, but
Montezuma’s expressive opposition to the “aesthetic propensities” of the Indian Bureau parallels
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the disciplinary critique of “excessive specialization” and “positive knowledge” that Boas
developed on the “firm footing” provided by Brinton’s philosophy of expression. It was through
his own commitment to this scientific project that Boas was able to imagine anthropology as a
collective emergence from the thralldom of tradition—not the thralldom to nature Brinton
feared—and thereby imagine into being a global community comprised of those who would
make it their personal responsibility to think and speak for themselves.
For both Boas and Montezuma, the main obstacle facing the global community they
envisioned—the “secondary understanding” to be overcome—was the widespread conception of
human history as an unending race war. This was the understanding to which Montezuma
referred when he spoke of “the game of ‘the survival of the fittest,’ competition of life in God's
appointed way, ‘by the sweat of the brow.’” In place of this prevailing understanding Boas and
Montezuma elected to put forward not a new master theory of human history—“WASSAJA is
not writing a thesis,” Montezuma wrote in 1916—but a practice: a new form of expressive
solidarity mediated by circulating discourse.66
To observe Boas’s unknowing affiliation with Montezuma is to see Boas from the global
perspective for which he so often searched, and thereby, perhaps, to discover a broader set of
communities in which he moved. This may run against Boas’s own sense of his intellectualhistorical singularity, but in another way it confirms his intuition that exemplary forms of
subjectivity, even of “genius,” can be recognized across the parochial boundaries between
disciplines and endeavors. I want, in closing, to draw attention to two insights that this
perspective brings into view.
The first is that expressive enlightenment cannot be accounted for by tracing the
transmission of knowledge among Euro-American elites. We must look backward from Boas to
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Brinton, Humboldt, and Herder, but we must also look sideways to figures like Spingarn and
Montezuma—to Boas’s contemporaries—in our effort to understand the pressures motivating
Boas’s reformation of anthropological practice and the ideas those pressures generated. The
second is that this sideways perspective on Boas can de-center the telos of the expanding “ingroup” that emerged as his hope for modern cross-cultural solidarity. As Montezuma and the
Society of American Indians demonstrate, expressive enlightenment constitutes a subject who is
a “multiple being,” a being who makes manifest his responses to local concerns within a
particular discourse that addresses itself to a universal audience.
This tenuous relation between the local and the global is encapsulated in the first number
of the newspaper Montezuma competed with, the Quarterly Journal of the Society of American
Indians. It occurs in an article by the editors advocating the study of ethnology in Indian
boarding schools:

And a new and still nobler and more important work awaits us: to demonstrate that there
is a higher and more significant bond; the relationship of created things, one with another,
and their inseverable kinship and relation with that Sovereign Power and Intelligence,
whom some men reverence as God, and whom other men call the Unknowable, the
Unseen, but whom Philosophy regards as the Totality of all things. And the American
Indian race should be found in advance in this important labor.67
There is something undeniably paradoxical about the way this universalistic effusion culminates
in a statement of ethnic pride. Then again, there is something paradoxical about the situation of
the Boasian knower, whether modern or “primitive,” who can only create an enlightened global
in-group by wrestling with the misunderstandings furnished by his local discourse community. In
both situations, the enlightened subject is expressed as a multiple self whose location lies at the
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center of plural solidarities of very different scales. Montezuma and the social movement he
helped bring into being can thus help us see something that Boas himself might not have
realized: that the mediation of local concerns in the public discourse fostered by expressive
enlightenment reproduces the same tension between in-group and out-group to which it claims to
offer a solution.
Today, there exist a number of scholarly vocabularies for discussing phenomena like
expressive enlightenment that exist in both local and trans-local, or “glocal,” social space.68 The
history of expressive enlightenment from Herder to Montezuma reminds us of the anxiety such
glocal discursive phenomena produce for individuals. Much like Herder’s warning to his wouldbe Socrates that he set out from “weak and indeterminate beginnings,” Montezuma’s assertion
that the modern American Indian could never be “reconciled to his situation” must be read as an
expression of the modern self writ large. The phenomenon of expressive enlightenment reveals
the extraordinary motivation such irreconcilable situations provide for the constitution of
discourse, and of subjects themselves.
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